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1. Introduction
In a developing country, finding and maintaining an efficient and reliable supplier can be
a costly and a time consuming process (Allen, 2014; Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2015;
Startz, 2016). One factor which can make this process more difficult, is if many other
firms are simultaneously searching for a supplier (Arnosti et al., 2018). This congestion
externality will occur when trading frictions mean supply cannot instantaneously meet
demand from multiple buyers. This is plausibly a large concern in developing coun-
tries where contracting frictions cause high adjustment costs (Macchiavello and Morjaria,
2019), and a lack of access to credit can cause firm supply-constraints (Manova, 2012).
One policy response is to open to international trade, giving firms access to a large pool
of suppliers which are less inhibited by these trading frictions.1
In this paper, I show that reducing international trade costs will lead to a greater num-
ber of matches in the international market, alongside an important and novel secondary
benefit - the alleviation of the consequences of congestion in the domestic supplier mar-
ket. I formalise this new mechanism for a domestic market consumer welfare gain from
trade and consider its effects in Uganda. I show empirical evidence consistent with the
Ugandan supplier market suffering from greater congestion than the international supplier
market. I then demonstrate through model simulations that, for the case of Uganda, the
impact of this channel on consumer welfare is quantitatively significant; a 25% reduction
in international trade costs in 2011 has led to a 5.2% increase in consumer welfare, 15% of
which is accrued to the difference in congestion between the two markets. Finally, I show
that the presence of search externalities lends support to policy interventions to reduce
search costs, but that these should be targeted at sectors less inhibited by congestion.
This analysis requires a unique combination of data on firm-to-firm domestic and
international transactions. I use Ugandan administrative Value Added Tax (VAT) data
1These firms are likely to be less inhibited given international exporters tend to be larger (Bernard
and Jensen, 2004) and with better access to credit (Manova, 2012). Indeed this channel should exist in
any two markets, where one is more congested due to firms being supply-constrained.
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that includes information on every transaction between domestic tax-paying firms. I also
use the government’s import customs dataset which includes details on both the buyer in
Uganda and the foreign seller. The combination of these datasets amounts to a dynamic
transaction-level firm-to-firm input-output matrix. Using the firm’s unique ID, I link this
dataset with other tax administration datasets: firm balance-sheet data, firm employment
information and detailed firm geographic location. Together, this constitutes a dynamic
picture of the entire Ugandan formal economy from 2010 to 2016. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first paper to combine this breadth of administrative firm-level
transaction-data in a developing country.
I start by developing a simple model of optimal search in two markets with different
search externalities. The model serves to highlight the key mechanism proposed in this
paper - after a trade cost reduction, firms increase search in international markets as
these goods become relatively lower-cost to source. This is mitigated by two forces.
First, as firms move into the import market, this increases aggregate import market-
tightness, thus decreasing the probability of an import match. Second, as firms move
out of the domestic-market, domestic market-tightness decreases, therefore increasing
the probability of a domestic match. The scale of these congestion effects depends on the
relative size of positive and negative search externalities in each market. These parameters
also determine the welfare consequences of a reduction in international trade costs. If there
is a greater positive externality to search in international markets compared to domestic
markets, then a reallocation of search towards international markets not only leads to
more matches in the international market, but also alleviates congestion in the domestic
market. This will lead to a greater number of overall matches which benefits consumers
with taste-for-variety.2
Motivated by the simple model, I undertake two empirical exercises. In the first
2An alternative way of thinking about the model is through a lens of trading frictions. In this sense,
buyers may be aware of the existence of suppliers, however, there is no centralized market where buyers
and suppliers meet and trade at a single price (Rogerson et al., 2005). In order to form a partnership
they must undertake costly investments which involve externalities.
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empirical exercise, I study the impact of a 25% reduction in international transport costs
that Uganda implemented in 2010-2011.3 I test the model’s predictions on number and
type of matches and show that: (i) there was a 80% increase in the number of new
importing firms; (ii) the firms that began importing in 2011 simultaneously adjusted
their supply-chain by dropping domestic suppliers; (iii) the suppliers that were dropped
as a consequence of this readjustment re-matched primarily with firms which were not
importers.
In the second empirical exercise, I look for evidence of search externalities in a reduced-
form setting. In the case of Uganda and consistent with previous literature,4 I show
that firms located in the same building adopt sequentially the same import suppliers. I
then show that this effect is substantially larger for firms located in the same building
compared to firms located in a next-door building. This is consistent with information
diffusing among firms about suppliers at a very local level. When looking at domestic
suppliers, however, this effect is not significantly different from zero. By contrast, in the
domestic market, a buyer adding a specific new supplier actually reduces the probability of
buyers in a different region of the country matching with that supplier. This is consistent
with geographically distant firms not benefiting from the information externality, but still
subject to the congestion externality, and has not been tested in the literature to date.
The results are in line with qualitative evidence that I collected through structured
interviews with firms in East Africa.5 I interviewed 25 managers from firms in a variety
of sectors6 who reported that: (i) it is common for buyers to share information about
international suppliers; (ii) international suppliers have the size or the ability to scale up
to service multiple buyers; (iii) domestic suppliers are limited in their ability to service
3The reforms are discussed in detail in Section 3.2.3. Given the reforms were exclusively conducted
outside Uganda or on the border crossing, I assume they had no impact on domestic trade costs.
4See for instance Bisztray et al. (2018) and Kamal and Sundaram (2016)
5Interviews were conducted with firms in Kampala in Uganda and in Kigali in Rwanda which has a
very similar structure of firm market.
6I interviewed firms in logistics, retail and wholesale, coffee and tea, hotels and tourism, agribusiness,
service input sectors. A full list of firms is available on request.
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multiple buyers and this means that sometimes there is wasted search effort.7
Having identified evidence consistent with there being a difference in externalities be-
tween domestic and international markets, I structurally estimate the quantitative model
by simulated method of moments in order to quantify the impacts of a search channel
on consumer welfare. However, in order to match the data, I extend the simple model
substantially. I build a dynamic quantitative version of the model where both buyers and
suppliers choose optimal search intensity and the proportion of search in each market.
The model builds on existing work by Eaton, Jinkins, Tybout and Xu (2016) (hereafter
EJTX (2016)), adding both a domestic and an international search decision and market-
specific matching functions, as well as adding firm heterogeneity and additional structure
to search costs.
The most important structural parameters are those which govern the returns to scale
in the matching function. I find that there are decreasing returns to scale to searching in
domestic markets and increasing returns to scale to searching in international markets,
as is consistent with the reduced-form results. I then test the external validity of the
model by simulating the effect of a reduction in international trade costs and comparing
the results to what is observed in the data. The proportion of firms that import increases
from 20% to 23%, the average number of import suppliers increases by 20% and the
average number of domestic suppliers decreases by 6.5%. The change observed in the
data is the same direction and of a similar magnitude to that seen in the simulation.
Finally, I run two counterfactual experiments. In the first experiment, I consider how
much the increase in consumer welfare is due to differences in search externalities between
markets. I again simulate the reduction in trade costs, but assume both markets have
the same constant returns to scale matching function. The average number of import
suppliers increases by a smaller amount (11.1% vs. 20.1%), as there is a larger increase
7For instance, in one interview I undertook with a firm they stated that they had asked another firm
in the same business park about their input supplier for imported packaging. In another interview a
firm had stated that they had tried to find a domestic transport firm but that another similar firm had
already taken the contract.
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in import market tightness. There is also a larger decrease in the average number of
domestic suppliers (-9.8% vs. -6.5%), this is because the reduction in search domestically
does not have the mitigating effect of reducing congestion in the domestic market. This
results in an increase in consumer welfare which is 15% smaller than when I allow there
to be differences in externalities between markets, demonstrating that allowing for search
externalities has a quantitatively important impact on welfare.
Second, I simulate the government of Uganda’s goal of a “25% reduction in search
costs for suppliers” as one of its four goals in trade (Government of Uganda, 2019).8 I
show that this leads to a 3-5% increase in consumer welfare, depending on where the
reduction is targeted. If the government reduces international search costs, then this
will significantly increase the number of matches in the same manner as the trade cost
reduction. If, however, the government reduces domestic search costs then the impact,
albeit still positive, is dampened by the increase in domestic congestion caused by a
greater number of searching firms.
This paper relates to three main strands of the literature. This paper contributes to
the literature on firm-to-firm search. The literature has shown that the competitive equi-
librium does not necessary result in the socially optimal level of search (Krolikowski and
McCallum, 2017), that search frictions explain firm’s export market decisions (Chaney,
2014), and that search influences predictions on gains from trade (Antras and Costinot,
2011). I build on work by Eaton, Jinkins, Tybout and Xu (2016), who write a dynamic
quantitative model of optimal two-sided buyer-supplier search which is rich enough to take
to the data.9 This paper’s contribution is to separately model search in domestic and in-
ternational markets and incorporating different matching technologies in either market,
providing new predictions on a search channel for consumer welfare gains following a
8The specific sub targets are i) establishing a internet platform support programme (e.g. organize
quarterly trainings on the use of Ali Baba), ii) encourage firms peer-to-peer learning (e.g. organize quar-
terly peer groups with Uganda business groups), iii) target key firms in supplier development programmes
(e.g. establish anchor firm support unit and annual public-supplier meetings).
9Other important contributions on sourcing include Rauch (2001), Rauch and Trindade (2002), Rauch
and Watson (2003). A parallel literature also exists on exporter search for buyer markets (See for instance
Eaton et al. (2017), Allen (2014), Albornoz et al. (2012)).
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reduction in international trade costs and using novel data.
In addition, this paper relates to the literature on the firm supply-chain impacts fol-
lowing a trade liberalization in the absence of search frictions. Arkolakis et al. (2012)
show that gains from trade are higher in models with intermediate goods. Tintelnot et
al. (2018) and Fieler et al. (2018) build quantitative models to show that the gains from
trade depend on domestic firm-to-firm linkages and how firms are directly or indirectly
connected to the international market. Antras et al. (2017) build a quantitative model
of global sourcing.10 I build on this literature by incorporating intermediate goods into
a model of domestic and international sourcing whilst also including a search channel.
Moreover, I consider not only firms’ international sourcing decisions but also the interde-
pendencies between this and domestic sourcing decisions.
Finally, the paper contributes to the empirical literature on firm-to-firm search exter-
nalities. The closest paper to the reduced-form work is Bisztray et al. (2018), which has
extremely detailed geographic data on firms in Hungary. The authors show that firms
in the same building sequentially add imports from the same country and in the same
product category. The paper also relates to Kamal and Sundaram (2016), who show a
similar effect for matched importer-exporter data but without detailed geographic data.
Cai and Szeidl (2017) show that when firms are randomly allocated into different busi-
ness groups they refer each other leading to a 9% increase in the number of suppliers.11 I
build on this literature in four ways. First, the Ugandan dataset contains details on both
the geographic location of firms and the matched supplier which gives more detail than
the existing literature. Second, I compare firms searching domestically to firms searching
internationally, providing evidence of the comparative size of domestic and international
externalities for the first time. Third, in addition to looking for a positive search exter-
nality, I also show results consistent with a negative search externality. Fourth, besides
10A connected literature considers the role of production networks in firm performance and the prop-
agation of shocks (Lim (2017), Carvalho (2014), Carvalho (2014), Bernard and Moxnes (2018), Bernard
et al. (2018a)).
11A number of related empirical papers highlight additional aspects of the search frictions among firms
(Bernard et al. (2015), Startz (2016), Steinwender (2018), Fafchamps and Quinn (2016)).
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providing reduced-form evidence of search externalities, I also provide structural evidence
of search externalities which differ between markets, which I use to show welfare conse-
quences of different counterfactual experiments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out a simple two-
period model of firm-to-firm search and shows comparative statics; Section 3 describes the
dataset and the context of the trade cost reduction, it also provides descriptive statistics
on how firms responded to the trade cost fall; Section 4 provides empirical empirical
evidence of search externalities in Uganda; Section 5 presents the quantitative model;
Section 6 structurally estimates the model; Section 7 provides counterfactual simulations;
and Section 8 concludes.
2. A Simple Model of Firm-to-Firm Search in Two Markets
To illustrate the key mechanisms in this paper, I build a simple model of buyers purchasing
intermediary goods from suppliers in international and domestic markets.
The simple model is shown graphically in Figure 1. Buyers sell a single differentiated
product to consumers in a frictionless retail market. Buyers purchase these products from
suppliers, who are either domestic or international,12 and each produces one differentiated
product. International suppliers produce a higher quality product, but must pay a higher
transportation cost. Buyers and suppliers cannot costlessly match, but must instead
undertake search to find a match. In both markets, a match between a buyer and a
supplier depends on the intensity of search effort and the equilibrium market tightness.
In order to incorporate differences in search externalities between markets, I allow the
matching technology to differ when looking for domestic or international suppliers.
I demonstrate the main mechanisms of the model by showing comparative statics of
a reduction in trade costs leading to a reallocation of search between markets, but with
some mitigation due to congestion.13
12International here implies a foreign exporter
13The simple model, however, misses some salient features observed in the data. In order to make the
model match key moments from the Ugandan data, I extend the framework in Section 5 to include a








Figure 1: Model Environment
2.1. Buyers, Suppliers and Consumers
There is a measure B continuum of buyers, measure SD continuum of domestic suppliers
and measure SI continuum of international suppliers. For simplicity, I assume for the
simple model that SD = SI = S.
Suppliers produce differentiated products which they sell to buyers once they match.
Let B(sI) denote the set of buyers who match with international suppliers. Similarly,
let B(sD) denote the set of buyers who match with domestic suppliers. For simplicity I
assume all suppliers have the same marginal cost.
Buyers pay an iceberg trade cost τI on each unit of international goods and iceberg
trade cost τD on each unit of domestic goods, where I normalize τD = 1.
Buyers begin with marginal cost c and no matches. Buyers have a fixed search intensity
σ but choose the proportion of search they exert domestically, a such that a ∈ [0, 1], and
internationally, 1− a.
Consumers demand differentiated products from buyers b with a CES utility function,

















where I assume all international products have the same demand shifter, ψI , and all
number of these features and estimate the quantitative model in Section 6.
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domestic products have the same demand shifter, ψD, which I normalize to 1. If imports
are higher quality products, we might expect ψI > 1 for imported goods, although I do
not impose this. η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods which does not vary
between imports and domestic products.
2.2. Pricing and Division of Profits
In period one, buyers search and matches materialize. In period two, buyers compete







where pb is the price charged by buyer b.
Substituting the mark-up into the profit function yields the instantaneous profit flow












for L ∈ {D, I}, (3)
where P is the standard CES aggregate price index and E is household expenditure. Once
I make the standard CES assumption that the elasticity of substitution η > 1, the profit
function behaves as one would expect - increasing in the aggregate price index, decreasing
in marginal cost. If there is a domestic good then τD = ψD = 1. For higher international
trade costs (τI) or smaller international demand shifter (ψI) profits from matching with
an international supplier are smaller.
I assume profits are split via Nash bargaining where Λ ∈ [0, 1] is the bargaining coeffi-
cient for the seller and 1−Λ is the bargaining coefficient for the buyer. This assumption
means I do not need to consider inefficiencies lost due to double marginalization.14
14In practice, Bernard and Dhingra (2015) show this assumption may not hold, but it is a necessary
simplification for the purposes of this paper as firm pricing is not a main feature of the paper’s focus.
Search Externalities in Firm-to-Firm Trade 10
2.3. Search and Matching
I assume two aggregate matching functions which are homogeneous of degree one in the
search of buyers and sellers, respectively. In the simple model, all sellers search such that
their aggregate search is simply given by their mass S. The aggregate buyers’ search in
each market is given by the mass of buyers multiplied by the amount they search in each
market, such that
BD = aσB
BI = (1− a)σB.
(4)
Following the labor literature, I assume that the aggregate measure of matches per
unit time (XD, XI) is homogeneous of degree one and increasing in the aggregate search
of buyers and suppliers
XD = SγSBγBD
XI = SβSBβBI .
(5)
The matching function exponents are key objects in the model. A positive externality
to search would be indicated by high γS, γB and βS, βB. This is because, at the margin,
an increase in buyers or sellers will lead to a large increase in the number of matches.
There are increasing returns to scale in domestic matching if γS + γB > 1, in which
case an increase in the mass of firms by 10% would have a greater than 10% increase
in the number of matches.15 By contrast, a congestion externality to search would be
indicated by low γS, γB and βS, βB, as more firms entering leads to very few new matches.
There are decreasing returns to scale in domestic matching if γS+γB < 1. A low γS would
indicate that congestion is largely on the domestic supplier-side. Whereas, a low γB would
15Allowing for the matching function to not be constant returns to scale generates a possibility for
multiple equilibria (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). For simplicity, I assume that firms obtain an
equilibrium with the highest level of search.
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indicate that there is high congestion among domestic buyers. It is common in the labor
literature to assume a constant returns to scale matching function, as this guarantees
a single equilibrium and has some empirical support (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).
However, this has not been as extensively tested in firm-to-firm search. In Section 4, I
show reduced-form evidence on the relative size of search externalities between markets.
In Section 6, I structurally estimate the exponents in a richer version of the simple model
to verify reduced-form results and to demonstrate further mechanisms within the model.
The match flow per unit of buyer search θ is a measure of market tightness and is








A higher value of θ simply indicates that the hazard-rate of finding a match is higher.
2.4. Optimal Search
Buyers solve a maximization problem by picking an optimal search intensity in the do-




aσθDπ(sD) + (1− a)σθIπ(sI)− k(a)
}
, (7)
where aσθD and (1 − a)σθI are the endogenous hazard rates of making a domestic and
international match, respectively. k is a convex search cost on the amount that buyers
search in each market such that ∂2k
∂a2
> 0 and k is minimized at a = 12 .
16 The rationale for
this assumption is that it is relatively easy to undertake a light search in either market by,
for instance, browsing the internet. However, undertaking a comprehensive search might
involve travel or hiring a consultant, which would increase costs rapidly.
Taking the first order condition of Equation 7 yields a policy function which determines
16Picking the minimum point at 12 is based on the assumption that searching equally in both markets
is the minimum cost. Changing this to an alternative minimum would not alter results.
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the optimal level of domestic search depending on the relative market tightness, the






The intuition behind Equation 8 is that the firm wishes to choose their proportion of
domestic search to equate the profit from matching with a domestic supplier multiplied
by the probability of a domestic match with the profit from matching with a international
supplier multiplied by the probability of a international match.
2.5. Comparative Statics
To demonstrate the main search channel in the model, I present comparative statics of
how firms respond to a reduction in transportation costs.
2.5.1. Buyer search decisions
The first comparative static shows how the proportion of search intensity in the domestic
market changes when international trade costs change. In order to obtain this comparative
















For the purposes of exposition, I discuss the case of a fall in transport costs to match
the case study of Uganda. The numerator of equation 9 shows the direct effect of a change
in trade costs; when trade costs decrease, the proportion of domestic search (a) falls as
returns to importing increases.
This is mitigated by two main forces. First, as firms increase import search, the inter-
national market becomes tighter driven by international congestion ∂θI
∂a
. Second, as firms
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move out of the domestic market, domestic market-tightness decreases ∂θD
∂a
. Together,
these forces reduce the amount of reallocation towards imports following the international
trade cost reduction.17
To reinforce the idea, consider a positive search externality in the international market
(βB is large). Assuming that βB < 1, then each additional buyer entering the international
market reduces the probability of other firms matching, but only by a small amount.
Therefore, a substantial volume of buyers can be absorbed by the international market
before market-tightness increases sufficiently to stop this flow.
If βB > 1, then each additional buyer joining the international market actually in-
creases the chance of existing buyers matching. Even in this case, the model predicts
that not all firms will search internationally, as buyers have convex search costs and there
would be a reduction in market-tightness in the domestic market, as discussed below.
If there is a negative externality in the domestic market then γ would be small. When
buyers leave the domestic market, this causes a large reduction in market tightness in
the domestic market. Consequently, it becomes easier for firms to match domestically,
causing a smaller reallocation towards imports following the trade cost reduction.
2.5.2. Consumer Welfare and Matching Efficiency
The second comparative static concerns consumer welfare. Given all buyers are ex-ante
identical, I can rewrite consumer welfare as the consumption from each buyer (C) mul-
tiplied by the matching probability of each type (A). A is made up of the probability
of a domestic match (aσθD) plus the probability of an international match ((1 − a)σθI)
17In addition to these two forces there is a third force coming from the convexity of the search costs
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The impact on welfare is therefore split into two parts. The first part is due to a
reduction in trade costs leading to higher consumption acting through lower marginal costs
∂C
∂τI
< 0. Meanwhile, the second part considers how the matching probability changes as
trade costs change ∂A
∂τI
. As shown in Appendix B.1.2, the change in welfare from matching




< 0 ⇐⇒ γBaγB−1 < βBψI(1− a)βB−1SβS−γSBβB−γB (11)
Equation 11 shows that for sufficiently large a and ψI ≥ 1, the change in welfare due to
matching depends on the relative size of the matching exponents. If γB < βB and γS < βS
then the returns to search are higher in the international market. Consequently, a fall
in trade cost will increase welfare, given firms will move from matching in the decreasing
returns to scale domestic market to the increasing returns to scale international market.
The intuition for this result is that a reallocation of search leads to more matches for the
same search intensity. Given consumers have a taste-for-variety, this generates an increase
in consumer welfare.18
In summary, following a fall in trade costs, both the level of reallocation between
18An alternative consideration is to compare welfare in the decentralized market economy to the level
of welfare should a social planner pick the optimal level of search in the presence of search frictions. This
is similar to the Hosios (1990) condition, which shows in a wide array of search models that the socially
optimal level of search occurs when buyers’ share of the joint match surplus equals the elasticity of the
matching function with respect to buyers (Mangin and Julien, 2018). However, the model does not fall
into this class of models given the matching function is not constant returns to scale and there are two
search markets.
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markets and the degree to which consumer welfare increases depend on the relative size
of search externalities in domestic and international markets.
3. Data, Context and Descriptive Statistics
Having demonstrated the main mechanism in the simple model, I now look for empiri-
cal evidence of reallocation in firm supply-chains following a reduction in international
trade costs. In this section, I first describe the datasets I use in this study, present de-
scriptive statistics on firms and their connections in Uganda, and discuss the context and
consequences of a reduction in trade costs.
3.1. Datasets
The data used in this paper comes from four linked datasets collected by the Ugandan
Revenue Authority (URA) which are administered for taxation purposes and cover the
period 2010-2016. This data is confidential and is made available for the purposes of this
research. Each tax dataset contains a unique tax identification number which allows the
datasets to be linked across firms and time. The datasets contain the universe of firms
paying tax in Uganda; consequently they are representative of the entire formal sector. It
also contains the universe of importing firms in Uganda, as all firms choosing to import
must go through a customs office and must be registered to pay tax. Inference on the
informal sector is outside the scope of this study.19
The first dataset contains details on domestic firm transactions. Ugandan firms are
required to record every transaction with any other tax-paying firm alongside the trans-
acting firm’s unique tax ID for Value-Added-Tax (VAT) purposes. This gives a line-by-line
19While I do not observe non-tax paying firms, this is not a major concern given tax paying firms in
Uganda are much larger and more technically adept (Kathage, 2018) and represent the sample of firms
I am most interested in. Between 2009-2011, 58% of Uganda’s workforce was working in the informal
sector, 13% of informal-sector workers were paid employees, 23% were unpaid helpers and 63% were
working proprietors (mainly subsistence farmers) (Overseas Development Institute, 2015). There is a
possibility that there is greater missed data domestically to internationally given import customs checks
are likely to be more thorough.
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Figure 2: Locations of firms in Uganda
Notes: Each point on the graph represents a unique location, although there are likely to be multiple
firms in each location. There are a small number of firms located on islands in lake Victoria located in
the bottom right.
account of the good transacted, the value of the transaction, the date it took place, and
the tax identification number of the linked firm. This dataset, therefore, constitutes a
dynamic input-output matrix for the entire Ugandan formal economy.20
The second dataset contains transaction-level international trade data. The dataset
includes variables of import origin, value, product and the matched foreign exporter on
the other side of the transaction.21
The third dataset is monthly balance-sheet data from VAT records from 2010-2016.
Ugandan firms are required to report on their total sales and total inputs each month. I
20It also allows a product-specific calculation of inputs, although this is not done for the time being
given the complexity of the data management process since records are manually entered without product
codes.
21There is also data on firm exports, although I do not use this for the purpose of this project given I
am primarily interested in firm sourcing behaviour.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Import Sample Domestic Sample
Number of buyers 6788 12984
Number of suppliers 24133 86689
Number of buyers (> 3 matches) 3373 7294
Number of suppliers (> 3 matches) 3451 17293
Firm-to-firm connections 71,000 420,000
Transactions 1.3m 11m
Mean Age 8.7 8.5
Median Wage Bill (USH) 100900 40100
Median Sales (USH) 1468800 972800
Notes: Data combined from Uganda administrative tax datasets from 2010-2016. The import
sample comes from import trade data and the domestic sample comes from the VAT transac-
tion dataset. Mean age comes from the firm registration dataset. Mean wage and sales comes
from the firm balance sheet dataset.
winsorize these variables at the 5% level and collapse to annual frequency.
The fourth dataset is a firm registration dataset and contains descriptive details on
the firm itself. This includes the ISIC industrial sector classification22 and a more general
description of its main operations. It also includes firms’ addresses which I show on a
map of Uganda in Figure 2.23
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The consolidated dataset contains
7,000 import buyers 13,000 domestic buyers, 24,000 import suppliers and 86,000 domestic
suppliers. There are in total over 12 million transactions and over 490,000 firm-to-firm
connections.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to link VAT transaction level data
with firm employee and importer-exporter matched customs data. This allows observa-
tions on the complete and dynamic picture of the formal economy of Uganda. As research
using tax data remains rare, one potential concern might be that the data is inconsistent
with other datasets. In Appendix A.2, I address this concern by comparing the tax data
used in this study to other freely-available data sources on firms in Uganda.
22Standard industrial classification of economic activities (ISIC) is a classification system for industry
categories. The URA classifies firms at a 4 digit level.
23Address geo locations were mapped using google maps API
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3.2. Context and Trade Cost Reduction Stylized Facts
3.2.1. Ugandan Economy
Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa which has experienced high and sustained
growth driven by high investment levels and strong international trade performance. The
economy is made up of a large services sector (56.6%); agriculture, forestry and fishing
(24.2%); and industry (19.2%) (World Bank, 2019).
Uganda is open to the external sector with imports reaching 25.9% as a share of GDP
in 2016/17 (International Monetary Fund, 2019). The largest components of imports are
consumables and capital goods for investment (World Bank, 2019).
As shown in Figure 4, only a small proportion of Ugandan firms import. As shown in
Table 1, importers are on average larger than firms who only source domestically, with
median sales and wage bill 1.5 and 2.5 times higher, respectively. This is consistent with
previous research on this topic (e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1999)).
On average, each Ugandan firm has 2.7 domestic suppliers. The sectors with the largest
number of connections are in service and manufacturing industries including construction
services, telecommunication services, accounting services, and the manufacturing of plastic
products, metals, and paper products.24
3.2.2. Buyer-Supplier Search and Search Externalities in Uganda
Finding a buyer or supplier in Uganda is a costly process. Sen (2018) argues that a lack of
information about Ugandan suppliers is one of the main reasons behind a lack of oil and
gas sector supplier development. Steenbergen and Sutton (2017), in neighboring Rwanda,
suggest that “international firms often do not have extensive local networks, and so are
unfamiliar with all the inputs that domestic suppliers may be able to provide.” Buyers also
have limited information about international suppliers given that the cultural, language
and/or knowledge barriers are difficult for Ugandan firms to navigate. Moreover, as few
24This topic is covered in detail in Spray and Wolf (2016)
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firms in Uganda import, there are a limited number of firms to approach for importing
advice.25 This has led the Ugandan Government to target reducing search costs by 25%
in 2019 (Government of Uganda, 2019).26
If information about potential new suppliers diffuses among firms, either deliberately
due to firms sharing knowledge or through buyers and suppliers meeting for instance in the
same business location, then this would imply a positive search externality.27 Qualitative
interviews I undertook with firms in East Africa suggest that in some instances knowledge
about new import suppliers is, indeed, passed among businesses.28
By contrast, it may be difficult for firms to make matches if there is a congestion
externality. Congestion occurs when one firm’s search reduces another firm’s chance of
matching. For instance, a buyer may spend resources looking for a supplier only to match
with a firm who is unable to meet the demand because they have recently matched with
another buyer (Arnosti et al., 2018). This effect has been shown to occur in multiple
contexts where there is a search friction. For instance, Fradkin (2015) shows congestion
in online platform AirBnB and Horton (2010) shows congestion in online labor markets.29
Given Ugandan suppliers are characterized by being small and with limited access to
credit (Spray and Wolf, 2016), one might expect that congestion effects are larger among
these firms compared to foreign importers. In an interview with a hotel in Uganda, the
CEO stated that they had tried to find a domestic fruit and vegetable supplier, but that
another similar hotel had recently signed up the supplier to an exclusive contract. In
Section 4, I look for evidence for both of these effects empirically.
25Indeed, making new connections internationally has been shown in other countries to be easier if
other firms in the same location are already importing (Bisztray et al., 2018).
26A similar goal is being targeted by the government of Rwanda through the Made in Rwanda policy
via establishing a publicly available supplier database to make information about firms operating in
Rwanda easier to find Spray and Steenbergen (2017).
27If this information is priced then it would no longer represent an externality, however, this was never
mentioned by firms.
28For instance, one tea processor explained that to find a foreign supplier of packaging products they
would speak to multiple other business owners to obtain advice before purchasing. This was recounted
to me in an interview with a tea factory CEO
29Fradkin (2015) shows a congestion effect for matches made on the online platform AirBnB, where
49% of inquiries are rejected or ignored by the host, and only 15% of inquiries lead to a transaction. An
initial rejection decreases the probability that the guest eventually books any listing by 50%.
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Figure 3: Transport costs for a 20’ container
Notes: Data comes from the World Bank Trading Across Borders Index. The y-axis shows the import
cost in US dollars per 20-foot container. The reform took place between 2010 and 2011.
3.2.3. Trade Cost Reduction and Descriptive Statistics
Despite having a high import volume, Uganda has some of the highest transportation
costs in the world. In 2017, Uganda ranked 136 out of 190 countries on World Bank’s
Trading Across Border Index (World Bank, 2016). The majority of goods entering Uganda
must first transit through the port of Mombasa in Kenya. In 2010, 68% of Ugandan
imports arrived from the Kenyan border.30 In 2010, the Mombasa port was described as
having “persistent congestion”, being “behind international standards” and facing issues
of “corruption and incompetence” (Bulzomi et al., 2014). Once goods are cleared from
the port, they are required to be transported over 1000km by road through Kenya, before
crossing the border into Uganda. A map of the main trade corridor, and location of the
six weighbridge truck stops is shown in Figure 17 in Appendix A.1.
High transport costs have been shown in other research in Africa to severely constrict
international trade (see Donaldson et al. (2017) for summary). Given Uganda’s high trade
costs, the effects of reducing transportation costs may be substantial.
30Based on customs dataset. 25% of imports arrived through the airport, and the remainder came
through the Tanzanian, Rwandan, Congolese borders or through the lake port in Jinja.
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Figure 4: Transport Costs and Imports
Notes: The black line shows transport cost in USD per 20-foot container from the World Bank’s Trading
Across Border Index between 2007-2014, the bars show the number of new importers. The data for the
bars comes from customs dataset. Reforms took place between 2010 and 2011.
In 2011, Uganda implemented reforms to reduce the cost of importing. The main
reforms were longer border opening hours and improved port infrastructure at the main
port in Mombasa (World Bank, 2011). In addition, Uganda rehabilitated roads thanks to
a large grant from the European Union and removed several weighbridges along the route
(Bulzomi et al., 2014). These reforms were negotiated at the East African Community
(EAC) level and so can be thought to be outside the direct control of the Ugandan
government, thus making them quasi-exogenous. The combination of these reforms led
to a 25% fall in transport costs in 2011, which then reduced the cost of importing a
20-foot container from USD5807 to USD4396 (-24.3%). As shown in Figure 3, this effect
happened rapidly over one year and was later stable.
I present three descriptive statistics on how firms responded to the reduction in trade
costs.
(i) Falling transport costs corresponded with an increase in importers
As shown in Figure 4, the fall in transport costs corresponded with an increase in
the number of new importers. The fall in transport costs was very rapid between 2010
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and 2011, and was then followed by a period of flat costs. Similarly, the increase in
importing also happened very rapidly followed by a corresponding period of zero growth.
I show in Appendix Figures 20 and 21 that the total number of importers, the average
number of suppliers and the proportion of firms which import also increase in line with
the falling transport costs.31 Although I do not observe a counterfactual of what would
have happened in the absence of falling trade costs, this fits with what one would expect
based on the previous literature in Africa (Donaldson et al., 2017).
(ii) Falling transport costs corresponded with new importers reducing domestic suppliers
relative to other firms
To demonstrate that the change in transportation costs also corresponded with firms
making readjustments to their domestic supply-chains, I compare the number of domestic
suppliers used by firms who first imported in 2011 to all other buyers in a difference-
in-difference specification as shown in equation 12. Note, that I do not have domestic





βt(δt × FirstImportIn2011i) + αi + δt + uit (12)
where DomesticSuppliersit is the log of the number of domestic suppliers supplying firm
i at time t, FirstImportIn2011i is a dummy variable indicating whether firm i first
imported in 2011, αi is a set of buyer fixed effects, and δt is a set of year dummies.
I plot the β coefficients in Figure 5, and present the results in regression format in
Table 10 in Appendix. I also show in Appendix Table 12 that this descriptive statistic
is robust to using the value of domestic inputs as opposed to the number of suppliers.
Relative to the control group,32 new importers reduced their number of domestic suppliers
31There is also an increase in exporting, although this happens slightly later, this is discussed in detail
in Spray (2017)
32In this case the control group is all other firms.
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Figure 5: β coefficients from specification 12
Notes: The figure plots the β point estimates from specification 12 and the 95% confidence interval. The
red vertical line shows the period of reduced trade costs. The outcome variable is the log of the number
of domestic suppliers.
by 10% in the year of the international trade cost reduction. The effect declines over time,
but is still significant at the 5% level two years later. This result is non-trivial, as we
might expect new-importers to be generally expanding and hence adding both domestic
and international suppliers. The fact that this is not the case suggests that firms choose
either domestic or international sourcing strategies.
(iii) Suppliers which were dropped by new-importers rematched with non-importing firms
As I observe which specific suppliers were dropped by first-time importers in 2011, I
now consider whether these dropped suppliers managed to replace their lost buyers with
buyers who were importers, or buyers who only sourced goods domestically in Uganda.




βt(δt ×Droppedf ) + δt + αf + uft (13)
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Figure 6: β coefficients from specification 13
Notes: The figure plots the β point estimates from specification 13 and the 95% confidence interval. The
red vertical line shows the period of reduced trade costs. The outcome variable is the log of the number
of domestic suppliers.
where Droppedf is a dummy variable for whether supplier f was dropped by a buyer who
first imported in 2011 and PropNonImportingBuyersft is the proportion of buyers for
supplier f at time t which do not import, excluding any buyers which were 2011 first-time
importers to avoid a spurious correlation.
As shown in Figure 6 and Table 11, suppliers which lost a buyer to a 2011 first-
time importer rematched with buyers who were not importers. This effect is significantly
different to zero even four years after the event. I also show in Table 13 that it is robust
to using the value of inputs as opposed to the number of suppliers.
We must treat these three descriptive statistics with caution as they show correlations
as opposed to causal relationships. However, together, the results are consistent with
the mechanism laid out in the simple model. When trade costs fell, importing became
more attractive which led to a rebalancing of search in favour of international markets.
This movement out of domestic search created space in the domestic market, allowing
non-importing firms to match with the dropped suppliers.
Search Externalities in Firm-to-Firm Trade 25
4. Reduced-Form Evidence of Search Externalities
In this section, I look for evidence consistent with search externalities in both markets in
reduced-form, and also present evidence on the relative size of these externalities between
markets.
4.1. Motivating evidence
Figure 7 shows the percentage of supplier matches which have at least one buyer in the
same neighborhood. The first bar shows that 21% of suppliers’ new matches with domestic
or import suppliers are in the same building as an existing customer.
This tight proximity between suppliers’ customers is consistent with the fact that it is
easier to sell to customers in similar locations. One explanation for this is that information
about potential suppliers may diffuse more easily among closely located buyers. This could
be because closely located buyers have stronger relationships or because suppliers may
bump into potential buyers operating close to their existing customers. This narrative
is supported by comparing the percentage of matches with a buyer in the same building
(21%) to the percentage of matches in the same or next-door buildings (25%), an increase
of just 4% from adding next-door buildings. Firms in the same building are unlikely
to be substantially different to their next-door neighbors, except in the ease with which
information can diffuse. However, even when moving from one building to the next, the
diffusion of knowledge appears to reduce substantially.
While these results are consistent with a positive information spillover, they do not ex-
ploit the richness of the data, and have nothing to say on the possible negative externality.
In the next section, I move into a more formal characterization of this effect.
4.2. Empirical strategy
In order to explain the empirical strategy, consider the following example. Two firms in
Kampala, {A,B}, are looking for a new supplier. Each firm can look for this supplier
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Figure 7: Percentage of suppliers’ matches which have an existing buyer in location
Notes: On the y-axis is the percentage of supplier matches with at least two buyer in the same location.
On the x-axis, the location progressively gets wider away, such that Next door refers to the proportion
of supplier matches with an existing buyer either in the same building or in the next-door building.
either locally or abroad. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, there are two ways A’s search
might influence B′s probability of matching; either B may pass information to A (a
positive externality) or B may crowd-out A’s chance of matching (a negative externality).
If information is easier to diffuse among firms located close to one another, then the
spatial diffusion of firms can be used to identify different externalities. In order to test for
a positive search externality, I consider whether one firm making a match increases the
probability of geographically close firms making the same supplier match. To test for a
negative externality, I consider whether one firm making a match decreases the probability
of geographically distant firms making the same supplier match.
4.3. Dataset
I begin by generating a dataset of every buyer-supplier-year triplet separately for domestic
and international suppliers. Given that I observe over 13,000 domestic buyers and 86,000
domestic suppliers over 6 years, this generates a dataset with 6.8 billion observations.
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However, many matches are unlikely to ever be formed. For instance, you would not
expect an iron ore mine to supply a tea factory. Instead, I trim this dataset to obtain
a sample of likely matches. First, I drop suppliers which have never sold to the buyer’s
ISIC 4-digit industry. Second, I drop any buyer or supplier which does not make at least
three matches over the entire sample period. Third, I drop any observations from the
sample following the first observed match. This restricts the sample to only consider the
first-time matches between firms which are active and which are in sectors which are likely
to trade.
4.4. Main specification
The main specification is given by the linear probability model shown in equation 14
Yift = µXneighborhoodif,t−1 + γX
other−city
if,t−1 + αi + αt + uift (14)
where Yift is a dummy = 1 if buyer i adds supplier f for the first-time in period t.
Xneighborhoodif,t−1 is a count of number of firms who matched with supplier f in i’s neighborhood
in period t− 1.33 Xother−cityi,t−1 is a count of number of firms who added supplier f in t− 1
but are not in i’s city.
If information diffuses among firms about suppliers, we would expect these effects
to occur more strongly among geographically closer firms. Therefore, µ > 0 would be
consistent with a positive externality.
If suppliers have a limited capacity to add multiple buyers at once, then firms making
matches elsewhere in the country should decrease the probability of buyers in other loca-
tions making a match. Therefore, γ < 0 would be consistent with a negative congestion
externality.
I consider four different definitions of neighborhood. The first two definitions of neigh-
33I run a robustness on this specification in Tables 17 and 18 where I test alternative functional
forms showing results are robust to including a continuous measure of the number of new buyers in a
neighborhood.
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borhood consider any firm located in 10 km and 1 km radii, respectively. While these
measures include a wide array of firms which could cause an information spillover, how-
ever, they suffer from the possibility that location-specific shocks hit geographically close
firms. This motivates the use of two additional measures of neighborhood that consider
firms located in the same building and firms located in next-door buildings. The second
specification, shown in equation 15, compares the latter two definitions of neighborhood
simultaneously, given that one might expect firms in the same building to be structurally
very similar to those located in next-door buildings in all respects except that information
is harder to diffuse across buildings than within buildings. Results would be consistent
with a positive spillover if µ1 > µ2 > 0.
Yift = µ1Xsameif,t−1 + µ2Xnextdoorif,t−1 + γX
other−city
if,t−1 + αi + αt + uift (15)
In both specifications, I include buyer and time fixed effects (αi and αt) which control
for unobserved buyer characteristics and time trends.
I consider domestic and international suppliers in separate regressions, and test whether
the respective coefficients are different.
4.5. Results
As can be seen in column 1 of Table 2, each additional importer of supplier f within a
10 km radius increases the probability of buyer i matching with supplier f by 0.086%.
This is a significant magnitude given that the baseline probability of a match is very low:
0.00393 for imports and 0.00398 for domestic samples. Column 3 demonstrate that this
effect is larger when just looking at firms in the same building, which is consistent with
information diffusion having a larger effect at shorter distances. Column 4 shows that a
firm in the same building adding a new supplier has a much larger marginal effect, when
compared to a firm in a next-door building adding a new supplier (0.09% vs. 0.001%,
respectively). This is consistent with a local information spillover among firms in the
same building, but that this becomes more difficult across buildings. Taken together,
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Table 2: Import Suppliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Xother−cityif,t−1 -0.00347∗ -0.00242 -0.00240 -0.00234
(0.00179) (0.00172) (0.00171) (0.00177)
Observations 4834635 4834635 4834635 4834635
Year and Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Unit of observation is buyer i, supplier f and year t. Dependent variable
Yift indicates a first match took place between buyer and supplier. Xkift is a
count of buyers in region k which added supplier f in t−1. Coefficients are mul-
tiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the buyer level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
these results are consistent with qualitative evidence that firms share information on
import suppliers presented in Section 3.2.2.
Evidence on negative spillovers is also consistent across specifications. Where an
additional buyer being added in a different city to buyer i in the previous year reduces
the probability of i matching by between 0.0023% and 0.0035%. This effect is small and
not statistically significant.
In Table 3, I show results for the same specification run on the sample of domestic
suppliers. As in the import case, having an additional buyer in the same neighbor-
hood increases the probability of buyer i matching with supplier f for all definitions of
neighborhood. Unlike the import case, this effect is not significantly different from zero.
Additionally, the magnitude of this positive coefficient is in all cases smaller than in the
import case.
Unlike on the import side, evidence in Table 3 is consistent with congestion effects
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Table 3: Domestic Suppliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Xother−cityif,t−1 -0.00515∗∗∗ -0.00515∗∗∗ -0.00515∗∗∗ -0.00516∗∗∗
(0.000962) (0.000967) (0.000972) (0.000938)
Observations 27975967 27975967 27975967 27975967
Year and Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Unit of observation is buyer i, supplier f and year t. Yift indicates a first match
took place between buyer and supplier. Xkift is a count of buyers in region k which
added supplier f in t − 1. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage
point marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the buyer level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
among domestic suppliers. In all specifications, an additional buyer in a different city
in the previous year decreases the probability of the firm matching by 0.0052%. This is
statistically significant at the 1% level.
Taking the results from Tables 2 and 3 together provides evidence consistent with a
positive externality to search in international markets and a negative externality to search
in the domestic market. As shown in the simple model, this should lead to higher welfare
gains following a reduction in international trade costs.
4.6. Mechanisms and Alternative Explanations
I now consider two main possible alternative explanations for these results; either that
very local shocks are driving results or that spillovers do exist, but that they are not
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search related. The full detail is provided in Appendix C.2.34
If firms in the same building were systematically different to firms in next-door build-
ings, then this might raise a concern that local shocks to specific industries drive results.
To address this concern, in Appendix Table 14 I compare the proportion of firms in the
same ISIC 4-digit sector in the same building to those in the next-door building. While
there is a small difference, it is not statistically significant. However, when I look at firms
further away, I do see this difference increasing. I therefore conclude that there is some
firm agglomeration, but that it is happening at a block level and not at a building level.
Moreover, the fact that the agglomeration decreases over space, but that the impact of an
additional buyer in the neighborhood does not dramatically decrease between columns 1
and 3 of Table 2 suggests this is not a major concern.
A second alternative explanation is that a spillover is taking place, but that it is not
search related. To allay these concerns, I test if the marginal effect is smaller among firms
where one would expect search frictions to be less prevalent. In Appendix Table 15, I
interact the independent variables with whether the import supplier exported from the
East African Community (EAC). This is because one would expect search frictions to be
smaller in local neighbors such as Kenya when compared to more distant locations.
Another prediction consistent with search frictions, is that suppliers which are not
supply-constrained will be able to match with multiple buyers, and so we should not
observe a negative congestion effect. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, this is the reason
why we did not expect to find a strong congestion externality on foreign imports, given
international suppliers are characterized by being large firms with cheap access to credit
and multiple customers. Results in Appendix Table 16 show that domestic suppliers
which are exporters, and hence less supply constrained, have a smaller negative effect
from making a match elsewhere in the country. This is again consistent with the search
narrative.
34A key point to keep in mind is that the main role of this section is to demonstrate a difference in
imports and domestic suppliers externalities. As long as these concerns do not differ systematically across
domestic and international suppliers, then we should be less concerned.
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5. A Quantitative Model of Buyer-Supplier Search in Two
Markets
Having shown reduced-form evidence consistent with greater positive search externalities
in international markets compared to domestic markets, I now present a full dynamic
quantitative model of optimal search among heterogeneous buyers and suppliers. This
is done for three reasons. First, the structurally estimated parameters substantiate the
reduced-form findings using a different yet complementary methodology.35 Second, the
structural model elucidates key mechanisms in how firms in Uganda respond to the in-
ternational trade cost reduction. Third, it provides a quantitative estimate of the role of
search externalities in welfare relative to a counterfactual experiment where I shut down
this channel.
The simple model presented in Section 2 highlights the key mechanism, but misses a
number of salient features in the data. The full model builds on the dynamic empirical
model developed by Eaton, Jinkins, Tybout and Xu (2016) (EJTX (2016)). The main
departure is that I add international and domestic suppliers, different search costs and
matching functions, and a greater degree of firm heterogeneity.
The most important extension from the simple model is to incorporate firm hetero-
geneity. As shown in Table 1, only a subset of firms in Uganda import and these firms
are on average significantly larger. In order to incorporate this feature, I allow firms to
draw a marginal cost and then pay a fixed cost for searching internationally, therefore in
equilibrium this means that only the lowest marginal cost firms import.
A second source of buyer heterogeneity comes in the number of matches made by
firms. I observe in the data that a large mass of firms have a small number of suppliers,
however, I also observe many firms with over 30 suppliers. I therefore allow buyers and
35The reduced-form methodology has the advantage of being clearer where the estimated coefficients
come from. However, in this paper the reduced-form structure is restrictive and one might expect that
there are multiple channels for search externalities to pass which are not picked up by the reduced-form. I
therefore turn to a structural model which allows a more clearly model-driven pass through of externalities
and has the large advantage of allowing the consideration of policy counterfactuals.
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suppliers to make multiple matches by making the model dynamic, adding an additional
search intensity decision, and exogenous link death probability. In addition to matching
buyer size distributions, I also match supplier size distributions by allowing suppliers to
make an optimal search decision.
5.1. Buyers and Suppliers
There is a measure B continuum of buyers, measure SD continuum of domestic suppliers
and measure SI continuum of international suppliers.
Suppliers produce differentiated products (x) which they sell to buyers (b) once they
match. Let B(sI) denote the set of buyers who match with international suppliers. Sim-
ilarly, let B(sD) denote the set of buyers who match with domestic suppliers. Suppliers
choose search intensity σSj (n). There is an exogenously given probability δ of an existing
match being severed.
There are Γ buyer types indexed i ∈ {1, 2, ...,Γ} with marginal cost ci drawn from a
known distribution, and match with s = {sI , sD} suppliers. This now warrants a change
of subscripts from buyer b to buyer type i. Buyers choose their search intensity σBi (s)
and choose the proportion of search they exert domestically, a such that a ∈ [0, 1], and
internationally, 1− a.
Buyers pay an iceberg trade cost τI on each unit of international goods and iceberg
trade cost τD on each unit of domestic goods, where I normalize τD = 1.
5.2. Consumers
Consumers have a nested CES utility function which shows their taste-for-variety over


























where J(sI)b is the set of international products x offered by buyer b and J(sD)b is the set
of domestic products x offered by buyer b, Cxb is consumption of product x from buyer b,
and Cb is consumption of the set of products offered by b. η and α are the elasticities of
substitution among products and buyers, respectively. I assume all international products
have the same demand shifter, ψI , and all domestic products have the same demand
shifter, ψD, which I normalize to 1. If imports are higher quality products, we might
expect ψI > 1 for imported goods, although I do not impose this.
5.3. Pricing and Division of Profits
As buyers now match with multiple suppliers, they sell multiple goods. They, therefore,
internalize the price set on one good on the demand of their other goods. This yields a






(px′b − cx′b) = 0 ∀x ∈ Jb, (18)
where cx′b is the marginal cost of supplying product x′ to consumers through buyer b.
The intuition behind Equation 18 is that buyers internalize that their pricing on one
good alters demand on other goods.
The instantaneous profit flow created by buyer b and its set of suppliers is now given

















for L ∈ {D, I} and where c̃b = cb/ψL is the quality-adjusted marginal cost, s = {sI , sD}
is a vector of the number of international and domestic suppliers, P is the standard CES
aggregate price index and E is household expenditure. As long as α > η > 1, then the
profit function is increasing in the aggregate price index and decreasing in marginal cost.
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This condition also ensures that there are diminishing returns to the number of suppliers,
given that adding a new supplier appears in the summation x ∈ Jb which leads to an
increase in profit but at a decreasing rate, as long as the exponent 1−η1−α < 1.
36 If the
buyer matches with a domestic supplier then τD = ψD = 1. For higher international
trade costs (τI) or smaller international demand shifter (ψI) profits from matching with
an international supplier are smaller.
As buyers now have multiple suppliers, division of profits becomes more complex.
I assume Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining which gives each seller a profit flow zji
equal to their bargaining share multiplied by their marginal contribution to profit which























Equation 20 is very close to being a structural equation which would be estimatable
in the data, therefore allowing the recovery of key parameters. However, the seller’s profit
zji is not observable in the data. Instead, the data shows a firm-to-firm transaction which
includes both profit and compensation for marginal costs in production of each good. If
a constant fraction λ of the variable costs is attributable to the seller,38 then the revenue













α− 1 + λ
]
, (21)
36In this way profit depends on the number of suppliers, however, this is not to be confused with
diminishing returns to scale in the matching function discussed in Section 5.4.
37Stole and Zwiebel (1996) is a generalization of Rubinstein bargaining to multiple firms based on
Shapley value which gives firms a constant fraction of revenue
38This assumption only influences the estimation of the structural equation for the purpose of extract-
ing the elasticity of substitution parameters. In all other aspects I consider the buyer and supplier to be
jointly maximising profits.
Search Externalities in Firm-to-Firm Trade 36







is the within buyer-i
revenue share of a type-j seller, λ is the seller’s fraction of marginal cost. Equation 21 is
a structural equation which I follow EJTX (2016) in estimating from the data in order to
obtain elasticity of substitution parameters η.
5.4. Search and Matching
Relative to the simple model, modelling search-and-matching is made more complex by
the addition of a search intensity choice for buyers and suppliers (σB, σS respectively) and
given that buyers have a choice on the proportion of search done domestically (a).39
Following EJTX (2016), I define a new variable, visibility (H) of a type-i buyer in
domestic and international markets, respectively, as
HBi,D(s) = ai(s)σBi (s)MBi (s)
HBi,I(s) = (1− ai(s))σBi (s)MBi (s),
(22)
whereMBi (sD, sI) is a measure of type-i buyers with s sellers. Intuitively, buyers of type-i
are more visible if they are searching more (aiσi, (1− ai)σi) and if there is a larger mass
of them (MBi ).
The overall visibility of buyers in the domestic and international market is a summation






HBi,L(s) for L ∈ {D, I} (23)
Domestic and international sellers’ visibility (HSD, HSI ) are defined symmetrically to buyers
HSD(n) = σSD(n)MSD(n)
HSI (n) = σSI (n)MSI (n).
(24)
39Where as in the simple model a ∈ [0, 1] and the amount of search internationally is 1− a.
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As in the simple model discussed in Section 2.3, the matching function exponents
are key objects in the model. A positive externality to search would be indicated by high
γS, γB and βS, βB. This is because, at the margin, an increase in buyers or sellers visibility
will lead to a large increase in the number of matches. There are increasing returns to
scale in domestic matching if γS +γB > 1. By contrast, a congestion externality to search
would be indicated by low γS, γB and βS, βB, as more firms entering leads to very few new
matches. There are decreasing returns to scale in domestic matching if γS + γB < 1. A
low γS would indicate that congestion is largely on the domestic supplier-side. Whereas,
a low γB would indicate that there is high congestion among domestic buyers. In Section
6, I structurally estimate the exponents using simulated method of moments.
The match flow per unit of buyer visibility θ is a measure of market tightness and is





XI(HSI , HBI )
HBD
. (27)
A higher value of θ simply indicates that the hazard-rate of finding a match is higher.40
5.5. Search Cost
In order to make sure that buyers do not enter a sorting equilibrium of only searching
domestically or internationally, I assume positive and convex search costs41 with a fixed
cost of search FS and an additional fixed cost of international search FI only paid if the
40θSL is defined symmetrically for L ∈ {D, I} type suppliers.
41See Section 2.4 for further justification of this assumption.
Search Externalities in Firm-to-Firm Trade 38









+ FS + FI , v > 1 (28)
Fixed costs are common in the trade literature following Melitz (2003) as they ensure
that high marginal cost firms only sourcing domestically. They represent the up-front
costs firms pay in entering international trade (see for instance Antras et al. (2017). I
structurally estimate FS, FI in Section 6.





, for L ∈ {D, I} and v > 1, (29)
which for simplicity are assumed to be the same for domestic and international suppliers.
5.6. Optimal Search
Buyers solve the following maximization problem by picking their optimal search intensity
σ and the proportion of that search intensity in the domestic market a




πBi (s)− kB(ai, σBi ) + sDδV Bi (sD − 1) + aσBθBDV Bi (sD + 1) + sIδV Bi (sI − 1) + (1− a)σBθBI V Bi (sI + 1)




where V Bi (s) is the present value of a type−i buyer that is matches with vector s ∈
{sI , sD} sellers, ρ time preferences, δ is an exogenously given link death parameter.
Buyers receive profit equal to gross profit minus search costs, (πBi (s) − kB(ai, σBi )),
until one of four events occurs with an endogenously given hazard: either (i) a buyer
drops a domestic supplier
(
V Bi (sD − 1)
)
, (ii) adds a domestic supplier
(
V Bi (sD + 1)
)
,
(iii) drops an international supplier
(
V Bi (sI − 1)
)
, or (iv) adds an international supplier(
V Bi (sD + 1)
)
.
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This yields policy functions for optimal search and the proportion of search in the
domestic market where the change in cost of search is equal to the change in the value
function from adding an additional domestic or international supplier multiplied by the
hazard of these events occurring
∂kB(σB, a)
∂σB
≤ aθBD∆sDV Bi + (1− a)θBI ∆sIV Bi (31)
∂kB(σB, a)
∂a
≤ σBθBD∆sDV Bi − σBθBI ∆sIV Bi (32)
where ∆sLV Bi = V Bi (sL + 1) − V Bi (sL) for L ∈ {D, I}. Equation 31 and 32 hold with
equality when a firm searches both internationally and domestically (a < 1).
Suppliers solve a parallel problem, where the value V to any seller matching with a
type-i buyer who has s suppliers depends on their type L and is given by
V SD,i,s =







ρ+ sDδ + aiσBi (s)θBD
V SI,i,s =







ρ+ sIδ + (1− ai)σBi (s)θBI
(33)
Intuitively, the supplier gets revenue ri(s) as defined in equation 21, until they either
lose a match with probability (sL − 1)δ or gain a match with probability depending on
whether the supplier is domestic or international aiσBθBD, (1− ai)σBi θBI . Taking expected








i (s), for Ł ∈ {D, I} (34)
where PBi (s) = HBi (s)/HB is the share of matches involving buyers of type−i with s
sellers.
Optimal seller search is then given by a parallel set of policy functions
∂kSD(σSD, sD)
∂σSD
= θSDV SD (35)
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∂kSI (σSI , sI)
∂σSI
= θSI V SI . (36)
The optimal level of seller search is, therefore, the expected value of a new relationship
multiplied by the probability of a match.
5.6.1. Equilibrium
The model is completed via an equation of motion, where the change in the mass of buyers









i (sD − 1, sI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
+ δ(sD + 1)MBi (sD + 1, sI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ii
+ (1− ai)σBi θBI MBi (sD, sI − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
iii




















Equation 37 shows the change in mass of type−i buyers with s sellers is equal to flows in
(i+ii+iii+iv) minus flows out (v+vi+vii+viii). Flows in is made up of the mass of type−i
buyers who have: (i) sD − 1 suppliers multiplied by the probability of adding a domestic
supplier; (ii) sD + 1 suppliers multiplied by the probability of losing a domestic supplier;
(iii) sI − 1 suppliers multiplied by the probability of adding a international supplier; (iv)
sI + 1 suppliers multiplied by the probability of losing a international supplier. Flows
out is made up of the mass of type−i buyers who have s suppliers multiplied by the
probability of: (v) adding a domestic supplier; (vi) losing a domestic supplier; (vii)
adding a international supplier; (viii) losing a international supplier. Finally, the measure
of buyers of type−i with sL = 0 is given by
ṀBi (0, sI) =
[
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ṀBi (sD, 0) =
[








A symmetric set of equations exists for suppliers.
As in EJTX (2016), I look for a stationary equilibrium at the steady state, I set
ṀBi (s) = ṀSj (n) = 0 and solve the system of equations for all buyer types and suppliers
given in equations 37, 38 and 39. I treat each buyer type as exogenously given.
6. Estimation
Model estimation takes place in three steps: 1) Estimating the transfer equation to ob-
tain elasticity of substitution parameters; 2) Externally calibrating parameters using the
literature, and; 3) Structurally estimating the model using simulated method of moments.
6.1. Estimating transfer equation
I follow EJTX (2016)’s methodology in estimating a transfer equation between buyers and
suppliers in order to identify the elasticities of substitution between buyers. I estimate
the structural equation 21 via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Equation 21 relates the
revenue passed between buyers and suppliers (rji) to the within buyer−i revenue share of
seller j. When taking logs and adding time dummies (dt) and a stochastic noise parameter
(ε), I can recover the coefficient on ln hj|i which incorporates the elasticity of substitution
between products (α) and elasticity of substitution across buyers (η)
ln rji(s) =
α− η
α− 1 ln hj|i + 1− η ln c̃ji + dt + εjit (40)
where rji is the revenue passed from buyer i to supplier j and hj|i is the within buyer-i
revenue share of seller j.
In order to address the term ln c̃ji, I include different fixed effects options. As in EJTX
(2016), I address the concern that there is comovement in ln hj|i and ln rji, not driven by
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Table 4: Estimating the transfer equation
(1) (2) (3)
OLS-FE IV-FE OLS-FE




Match FE yes yes no
Buyer FE no no yes
Importer FE no no yes
Year FE yes yes yes
N 686170 686170 686170
Notes: Unit of observation is buyer i supplier j and year
t. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the buyer
level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the components of the model, by using an instrument for ln hj|i which is equal to a share-
weighted average of the number of buyers of the other sellers at buyer j. The instrument
should be correlated with h through common shocks for similar products but should not
influence revenue through any other channel.
I also run a separate model where I assume that all suppliers are identical except in
allowing fixed effects to differ between import and domestic suppliers. In this case, I
include just the log of the number of suppliers as the explanatory variable.
The first result from Table 4 is that the coefficient α−η
α−1 < 1. Therefore, I conclude,
as in EJTX (2016), that the elasticity of substitution across varieties (α) exceeds the
elasticity of substitution across buyers (η). Therefore, as shown in equation 19, there are
decreasing returns to adding new suppliers.42 Note that this is not to be confused with
returns to scale in the matching function, which I estimate within the model. In column
2 of Table 4, I adopt the IV strategy and observe that the estimate increases but remains
below 1.
Finally in column 3, I estimate the transfer equation where I assume all suppliers have
42As discussed after equation 19, this condition ensures that there are diminishing returns to the
number of suppliers, given that adding a new supplier appears in the summation x ∈ Jb which leads to
an increase in profit but at a decreasing rate, as long as the exponent 1−η1−α < 1.
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the same marginal costs. Intuitively, for a given buyer adding another supplier lowers
the revenue transferred to all other suppliers. As shown in Appendix equation B.11, the
coefficient on lnn is equal to −α−η
α−1 . Intuitively, for a given buyer adding another supplier
lowers the revenue transferred to other suppliers.






. Given the model’s assumption that all suppliers have the same
marginal cost, I use column 3 as my preferred specification.
6.2. Externally calibrated parameters
There are 8 parameters that are externally calibrated. The elasticity of substitution with
respect to products α is set to 4.35 as in EJTX (2016). Using α = 4.35, I can infer from
column 3 of Table 4 that η = 3.35. This is coincidentally identical to the value estimated
in EJTX (2016).43 Firms’ productivities are assumed to be Pareto distributed with shape
parameter κ = 4.25 following Melitz and Redding (2015). The remaining parameters are
adopted from the literature and are displayed in Table 5.
6.3. Internally calibrated parameters
I structurally estimate 7 key parameters of the model (ξ = {FD, FI , ψI , γS, γB, βS, βB})
using Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). This method selects the model parameters
to minimize the difference between the simulated model generated moments and the
moments in the data, by minimizing the following objective function







where ζ is a vector of moments to be targeted internally, L (ζ) quadratic loss function
to be minimized, Mm(ζ) vector of model moments, Md vector of corresponding data
counterparts of the moments of interest, Mm(ζ)−Md is the orthogonality condition and
43EJTX (2016) use Colombian data finding a coefficient of -0.382 for rubber products and -0.289 for
textiles. They take a middle point of these estimates to obtain -0.3 which works out as an eta = 3.35
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Table 5: Model Parameters
Externally Calibrated Parameter Value Data source
α Elasticity of sub. products 4.35 Eaton et al. (2016)
η Elasticity of sub. buyers 3.35 Estimated in transfer equation
Λ Bargaining coefficient 0.5 Eaton et al. (2016)
v Convexity of search cost 2 Eaton et al. (2016)
δ Death parameter 0.4 Calculated in data
τ Iceberg trade cost 1.45 Atkeson and Burstein (2008)
κ Pareto shape parameter 1.45 Melitz and Redding (2015)
ρ Time preference 0.05 Eaton et al. (2016)
Internally Calibrated Parameter Value Most important moment
ψI Import premium 1.92 (0.0211) Ratio of imports to domestic among importers
FD International fixed cost 0.24 (0.0061) Prop of firms import
FI Domestic fixed costs 0.001 (0.0001) Number of active firms
γB D buyer matching CD share 0.45 (0.0093) Prob. of a new match for dom. buyer
γS D supplier matching CD share 0.50 (0.0087) Prob. of a new match for dom. supplier
βB I buyer matching CD share 0.60 (0.0112) Prob. of a new match for imp. buyer
βS I supplier matching CD share 0.66 (0.0106) Prob. of a new match for imp. supplier
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses based on 25 bootstrapped samples drawn with replacement.
WN is a positive semi-definite weighting matrix which for simplicity is the identity matrix.
As shown in Table 6, I obtain 10 moments from the data using periods prior to the
trade cost reduction. Intuitively, the proportion of buyers which are importers and the
ratio of imports to domestic inputs among importers ties down the import premium and
the import fixed cost. The mass of active firms ties down the domestic fixed cost. Each
of the matching parameters are tied down by the combination of the probability of a new
match for their type (domestic, international, buyer, supplier) and also the mass of active
buyers and suppliers of their type in the population.
The results are given in Table 5. Importantly, I find that imports have a 1.92 times
quality premium over domestic goods which is consistent with imported goods being of a
higher standard. However, fixed costs of searching for imports are 240 times higher than
the fixed cost of searching for domestic goods.
The most important parameters are the matching coefficients γ and β. Consistent
with the reduced form evidence, I find that there are decreasing returns to search in the
domestic market (γS +γB < 1). By contrast, there are increasing returns to search in the
international market (βS + βB > 1). In Section 7, I show numerically that this results in
higher consumer welfare following a fall in transport costs.
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Table 6: Model fit
Moment Model Value Data Value
Ratio of imports to domestic among importers 0.58 0.59
Proportion of firms which import 0.24 0.20
Prob. of a new match for international suppliers 0.20 0.28
Prob. of a new match for domestic suppliers 0.30 0.31
Prob. of a new match for international buyer 0.32 0.35
Prob. of a new match for domestic buyer 0.18 0.24
Number of active international suppliers 11,100 8,400
Number of active domestic suppliers 14,400 13,600
Number of active international buyer 5,700 4,800
Number of active domestic buyer 18,300 19,200
Notes: Table shows model generated moments and corresponding data moments. The ratio of im-
ports to domestic among importers is calculated by dividing the total import value by the total
value of inputs (imports + domestic goods). The proportion of firms which import is simply the
proportion of buyers which imported in 2010 divided by the total number of buyers. The proba-
bility of a new match for an each type of buyer and supplier is calculated by seeing the proportion
of firms which add a new match. The number of active firms is calculated as the number of firms
in the dataset with positive sales in 2010.
6.4. Model Fit
Table 6 compares the simulated model moments with their data counterparts, highlighting
a close fit. The model also does well in matching untargeted moments. For example, as
shown in the top two charts of Figure 8, the model’s generated mass distribution of buyers
with different numbers of domestic and international suppliers closely matches its data
counterpart.
However, as shown in the bottom two charts of Figure 8, the model does less well
in matching the distribution of supplier with different numbers of buyers. Although the
shape of the distribution is similar, the model overestimates the density of suppliers with
a small number of buyers. This is because the model has less flexibility on the supplier
side relative to the buyer side given I assume all buyers have the same marginal costs. It is
also consistent with fit of the quantitative model in Lim (2017) which also underpredicts
the extent of connections of the most connected firms.
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Figure 8: Model fit: buyer and supplier out-degree
Notes: The top two figures shows the density of buyers with different numbers of international and
domestic suppliers, respectively. the bottom two figures shows density of international and domestic
suppliers with different numbers buyers. The blue lines show the model predicted density and the orange
lines show the true value observed in the data.
6.5. Heterogeneity
In addition to the model’s aggregate predictions, it also demonstrates that firms behave
differently depending on their marginal cost. In Figure 9, I group firms into marginal
cost bins from 1 to 10 on the x-axis, and show the average level of search for each firm
in each bin in international (red) and domestic markets (blue) on the y-axis. Due to
the large fixed cost of importing, only the lowest marginal cost firms choose to search
internationally. These firms also search domestically due to the convex costs to searching
in each market.
Firms just below the threshold of paying the import fixed cost end up spending more
Search Externalities in Firm-to-Firm Trade 47
Figure 9: Search by marginal cost
Notes: The x-axis breaks buyers into 10 different marginal cost bins, where 1 indicates the lowest marginal
costs and 10 equals the highest marginal costs. The y-axis shows the average search undertaken by buyers
in each of these groups. The solid red and blue lines show the amount of domestic and international search,
respectively, before the trade cost reduction.
on searching in the domestic market than the lower marginal cost firm, causing the peak
in domestic search for firms in the second marginal cost bin. This is because, the lower
marginal cost firms (in marginal cost group 1) have higher convex search costs given that
they search both domestically and internationally. Following this peak, as marginal costs
increase, firms spend progressively less on search given the diminishing marginal returns
to adding new suppliers is more binding to firms with higher marginal cost.
7. Counterfactual Simulations
I now test the external validity of the model by simulating a reduction in transport costs
to match the observed reduction in East African trade costs shown in Section 3.2.3. I
then demonstrate the role of search externalities through two counterfactual experiments.
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7.1. Experiment 1: Transport cost reduction under structurally
estimated parameters
As discussed in detail in Section 3.2.3, between 2010 and 2011, the cost to import a
shipping container into Uganda fell rapidly by 25% driven by policy at the East African
Community level.
Results from simulating this reduction in the model are shown in Table 7. The pro-
portion of firms that import increases from 20% to 23%, as it becomes profitable for more
firms to pay the fixed cost of importing. The average import search intensity increases by
21% and domestic search intensity decreases by 3%. The large increase in import search
translates into a 20% increase in the average number of import suppliers.
The aggregate figures hide important heterogeneity which demonstrates the influence
of search externalities. It also maps to the descriptive statistics shown in Section 3.2.3 and
the comparative statics shown in 2.5. As shown in Figure 10, firms in the second marginal
cost group become importers and existing importers increase their search leading to the
average number of import suppliers increasing from 2.05 to 2.47. This directly maps to
descriptive statistic (i): as transport costs fall, imports increase. As they do this, they
are pushed up their convex search cost constraint and so reduce the amount they search
domestically (domestic search for marginal cost bin 2 firms decreases from 0.21 to 0.14).
This maps to descriptive statistic (ii): new importers drop domestic suppliers. This then
increases market tightness in the international market and reduces market tightness in
the domestic market. Consequently, higher marginal cost firms, which do not import,
increase their domestic search as the probability of finding a domestic match increases
(average search for firms in marginal cost bin 3 increases from 0.15 to 0.18). This maps to
descriptive statistic (iii) dropped domestic suppliers re-match with non-importing buyers.
Table 7 also reports the observed changes in firm outcomes as seen in the Government
of Uganda tax data. The observed change is the same direction and of a similar magnitude
to that seen in the simulation. The main disparity is in domestic suppliers, where the
reduction is overestimated by the model. This is because there was growth in the domestic
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Table 7: Outcomes from 25% transport cost reduction
Outcome High τ Low τ Change Data
Percentage of Importers 20.01 23.05 15.2% 16%
Av. Import Suppliers 2.05 2.47 20.1% 19%
Av. Domestic Suppliers 2.70 2.52 -6.5% -1.6%
Domestic Search (aσ) 0.119 0.115 -3.14%
Import Search ((1− a)σ) 0.704 0.851 20.88%
Consumer Welfare 5.2%
Notes: Table shows the model generated outcome variables under the
high and low trade cost equilibriums and the percentage change. This
is compared to the observed percentage change in the real data. Aver-
age refers to the average number of suppliers over all firms.
economy outside of the influence of the trade cost reduction. As the results from the trade
cost reduction were not used in the parametrization of the model, the fit to the observed
shift provides external validity to the model.
Figures 11 and 12 provide more detail on the change in the distribution of firm size.
The trade cost reduction lead to an increase in the number of international suppliers for
firms of all sizes. The biggest shift, however, comes at the tails of the distribution where
the number of firms with greater than 15 suppliers increases by 1.7%. There is also a
shift in the number of medium-sized importers as the proportion of firms which import
increases by 16%.
Finally, the model shows that a 25% transport cost reduction led to a 5.2% increase
in consumer welfare. As shown in Section 2.5, this is due to: i) the lower marginal cost of
importing having an income effect, and ii) the increase in matching efficiency from moving
to the increasing returns to scale international market.44
44An extension would consider the short and long-run effects from the intervention. In the short-run,
the model predicts that the reallocation of search towards the international market frees up space in the
domestic market given domestic suppliers can now re-match. However, in the long-run these firms may
no longer be profitable causing firm exit and reversing the gains from a reduction in domestic market
tightness. This could be incorporated into the model with a fixed-cost on suppliers.
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Figure 10: Search by marginal cost
Notes: The x-axis breaks buyers into 10 different marginal cost bins, where 1 indicates the lowest marginal
costs and 10 equals the highest marginal costs. The y-axis shows the average search undertaken by buyers
in each of these groups. The solid red and blue lines show the amount of domestic and international search,
respectively, before the trade cost reduction. The red and blue dashed lines show the amount of domestic
and international search, respectively, after the trade cost reduction.
Figure 11: Mass of firms with SI inter-
national suppliers
Figure 12: Mass of firms with SD domes-
tic suppliers
Notes: Figures show model predictions on the density of buyers with different number of suppliers before
and after the trade cost fall. the left hand panel shows the density of buyers with sI international suppliers
and the right hand panel shows the density of buyers with sD domestic suppliers. The orange line shows
the density prior to the trade cost fall and the blue line shows the density after the trade cost fall.
Search Externalities in Firm-to-Firm Trade 51
7.2. Experiment 2: Transport cost reduction under constant returns to
scale matching function
The second counterfactual experiment tests how much search externalities influence con-
sumer welfare. I shut down the difference in search externalities between markets by
assuming that both markets have the same constant returns to scale matching function.
Table 8 compares the results of the second experiment to those with structurally
estimated matching parameters. When both matching functions are constant returns to
scale, the most obvious difference between the two experiments is the smaller magnitude
by which the average number of import suppliers increases (11.1% vs. 20.1%). This is
due to the import market becoming tighter, making it relatively harder for firms to match
for each unit of search.
Domestic search also decreases in the CRS experiment. This leads to a larger re-
duction in the average number of domestic suppliers suppliers (-9.8% vs. -6.5%). This
is because the reduction in search domestically does not have the mitigating effect of
reducing congestion in the domestic search market.
Figure 13 shows the average number of suppliers for buyers on the y-axis, and different
trade cost reductions on the x-axis. This is plotted for both the case of different search ex-
ternalities (IRS) and where both matching functions are constant returns to scale (CRS).
Figure 13 shows that for larger trade cost reductions, the difference in the predicted num-
ber of suppliers diverges. For a 10% reduction in search costs the average number of
international suppliers increases by 2.4% in the increasing returns to scale simulation and
1.7% in the constant returns to scale model. Whereas for a 25% reduction in search costs
the average number of international suppliers increases by 20% in the increasing returns
to scale simulation and 11% in the constant returns to scale model, a larger difference.
This non-linearity in the model is due to the non-linearity in the two matching function -
as more firms switch into the increasing returns to scale sector from the decreasing returns
to scale sector there is an increasingly large impact on matching efficiency.
This non-linearity is also shown in Figure 14, where consumer welfare is increasing as
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Table 8: Outcomes from 25% transport cost reduction under different matching func-
tions
Outcome Change IRS Change CRS Real Change
Percentage of Importers 15.20% 12.77% 16%
Av. Import Suppliers 20.1% 11.10% 19%
Av. Domestic Suppliers -6.5% -9.77% -1.6%
Domestic Search (aσ) -3.14% -5.82%
Import Search ((1− a)σ) 20.88% 17.65%
Consumer Welfare 5.2% 4.4%
Notes: Table shows the change in the model generated outcome variables under
the model estimated parameters on the matching function which allow different
externalities between both markets (IRS), under the case where the matching
function is assumed to be constant returns to scale for both markets (CRS),
and the observed change in the data. Average refers to the average number of
suppliers over all firms.
Figure 13: Average number of international and domestic suppliers for different reduc-
tions in trade costs when search externalities are shut down (CRS) compared to struc-
turally estimated parameters (IRS)























Notes: The y-axis shows the change in the average number of suppliers where the baseline is normalized to
1. The x-axis shows the reduction in trade costs from 0 to 30%. The orange line (IRS) shows the change in
the average number of suppliers when the model is estimated using the structurally estimated parameters
which allows for increasing returns to scale in matching internationally and decreasing returns to scale in
matching domestically. The blue line (CRS) shows the change in the average number of suppliers when
the model is estimated shutting down differences in the returns to scale in matching between domestic
and international markets.
trade costs fall, and is increasing more rapidly in the simulation which allows for different
externalities. A 25% reduction in trade costs results in a 15% larger increase in consumer
welfare in the simulation with different search externalities, compared to the simulation
with the same externalities in both markets.
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Figure 14: Consumer welfare gains from trade when search externalities are shut down
(CRS) compared to structurally estimated parameters (IRS)











Notes: The y-axis shows the change in consumer welfare where the baseline is normalized to 1. The
x-axis shows the reduction in trade costs from 0 to 30%. The orange line (IRS) shows the change in the
average number of suppliers when the model is estimated using the structurally estimated parameters
which allows for increasing returns to scale in matching internationally and decreasing returns to scale in
matching domestically. The blue line (CRS) shows the change in the average number of suppliers when
the model is estimated shutting down differences in the returns to scale in matching between domestic
and international markets.
7.3. Experiment 3: Search cost reduction
Table 9: Outcomes from 25% search cost reduction
Change following 25% decrease Change following 25% decrease
Outcome in domestic search costs in import search costs
Percentage of Importers -0.48% 10.16%
Av. Import Suppliers -0.74% 35.1%
Av. Domestic Suppliers 10.02% -4.54%
Domestic Search (aσ) 9.93% -1.62%
Import Search ((1− a)σ) -0.97% 40.57%
Consumer Welfare 3.4% 4.3%
Notes: Table shows the change in the model generated outcome variables under a 25% decrease in domes-
tic search costs and a 25% decrease in international search costs. Average refers to the average number
of suppliers over all firms.
In experiment 3, I simulate the Ugandan government’s stated target for 2019 to re-
duce search costs for suppliers by 25% (Government of Uganda, 2019). The specific sub
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Figure 15: Search by marginal cost if re-
duce domestic search costs by 25%








Domestic Search, high D search cost
International Search, high D search cost
Domestic Search, low D search cost
International Search, low D search cost
Figure 16: Search by marginal cost if re-
duce international search costs by 25%











Domestic Search, high I search cost
International Search, high I search cost
Domestic Search, low I search cost
International Search, low I search cost
Notes: The x-axis breaks buyers into 10 different marginal cost bins, where 1 indicates the lowest marginal
costs and 10 equals the highest marginal costs. The y-axis shows the average search undertaken by buyers
in each of these groups. The solid blue and red lines show the amount of domestic and international search,
respectively, before the reduction in search costs. The blue and red dashed lines show the amount of
domestic and international search, respectively, after the search cost reduction. The left graph shows the
impact for reducing domestic search costs. The right graph shows the impact from reducing international
search costs.
targets are i) establishing a internet platform support programme (e.g. organize quarterly
trainings on the use of Ali Baba), ii) encourage firms peer-to-peer learning (e.g. orga-
nize quarterly peer groups with Uganda business groups), iii) target key firms in supplier
development programmes (e.g. establish anchor firm support unit and annual public-
supplier meetings). Intervention (ii) mimics the work done by the Chinese government
and documented by Cai and Szeidl (2017), where firms which meet regularly for business
meetings have been shown to increase the number of clients by 12% and the number of
suppliers by 9%.
The idea behind this experiment is to consider whether the government’s stated target
would improve firm outcomes and where the search cost reduction would be best targeted.
In order to consider this question, I run two separate counterfactual experiments - first
lowering the domestic search costs and then the import search costs.
The outcomes from the experiment are given in Table 9 and Figure 15. When re-
ducing domestic search costs, there is a sharp increase in buyers’ domestic search and
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consequently the average number of domestic suppliers increases by 10%. This is of a
similar magnitude to the 9% increase in suppliers found in Cai and Szeidl (2017) follow-
ing the business-meeting intervention. As can be observed in Figure 15, this increase in
domestic search is observed across all levels of buyer marginal cost. However, the increase
in the number of domestic matches is relatively modest (10%), as the increase in domestic
search leads to an increase in domestic market congestion. There is also a small decline in
international search (-1%), as firms make a substitution decision away from international
markets.
As shown in Table 9 and Figure 16, when reducing international search, there is a
large increase in import search (40.6%) leading to a 35% increase in import suppliers. As
can be observed in Figure 16, this is concentrated among the low marginal cost firms,
as for all other firms they still do not choose to pay the import fixed cost. These firms,
reduce the amount they search domestically, given they are still subject to a convex cost
of searching in both markets. This then frees up space in the domestic market, captured
by higher marginal cost firms. Therefore, the second experiment acts in a similar way to
the trade cost reduction in leading to welfare gains through both the lower marginal costs
and the benefit of moving from the decreasing returns to scale market to the increasing
returns to scale market. As a consequence, reducing international search costs increases
consumer welfare by 4.3%.
By contrast, when domestic search costs fall, firms increase domestic search, however,
this leads to a large increase in domestic market tightness due to the domestic congestion.
Therefore, the impact of the reform is muted.
These results provide support for the government of Uganda’s policy of lowering search
costs as the impact on welfare is of a similar magnitude to lowering international trade
costs by 25%. The results show that the impact of the reforms will be greater if the
government focusses on lowering international search costs. Therefore, the government
may focus on their planned interventions to train firms on using platforms such as Ali
Baba and Amazon and by having firms meet with firms who have experience of importing
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in a similar vein to Cai and Szeidl (2017).
8. Concluding Remarks
Using novel data on both domestic and international firm-to-firm transactions from Uganda,
I show that the presence of search frictions between buyers and suppliers, in a low-income
country, can have a significant impact on how firms respond to a trade liberalization.
I show in a model of firm-to-firm search and matching in two markets that the rela-
tive size of search externalities determines the extent of sourcing reallocation, as well as
changes to consumer welfare. Given the importance of the search externality parameters,
I then show through both reduced-form evidence and structural model estimation that
there are stronger positive externalities in international markets compared to domestic
markets. I then demonstrate through model simulations that the impact of this channel
on consumer welfare is quantitatively significant.
While, the estimates in this paper are specific to the Ugandan context, however, the
mechanisms are general to any setting which has search frictions between buyers and
suppliers. There is reason to believe that the relative size of the effects maybe larger
in a low-income country setting where search frictions are substantial, although, this is
speculative without obtaining similar data in a different setting. This does suggest a
channel for future work.
The results in this paper provide support for policy intervention to address search
frictions. As is the case with all search frictions, the first-best outcome would be to
remove the search friction entirely. In the context of the model presented in this paper,
this would mean all firms finding and matching with suppliers costlessly. In practice this
is not feasible, instead, governments can focus on reducing search costs. The Ugandan
government’s goal of providing training on platforms such as Ali Baba and Amazon to
Ugandan businesses will have a large impact as these channels directly target lowering
international search costs. Similarly, encouraging firms to learn from each other has
been shown in other contexts to improve firm-to-firm matching (Cai and Szeidl, 2017).
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Results from this paper suggest the Ugandan government should focus on interventions
that target reducing the cost to international search as opposed to domestic search. This
is because lowering the cost to domestic search may simply increase congestion leading
to a small increase in matches. However, lowering international search costs will increase
both international matches and reduce domestic congestion.
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A. Context Appendix
A.1. Map of trade corridor
Figure 17: Map of trade corridor, Osawa, WCO
A.2. Data comparison
Given research using tax data remains rare, one potential concern might be that the data
is of low quality. This section addresses this concern by comparing the tax data used in
this study to other freely available data sources.
Figure 18 shows a comparison between the raw export trade data used in this study and
trade data from the WTO. From the graph it appears as if the WTO data is understating
the actual export volumes. However, for the purposes of this study, the important fact is
how closely the two lines track one another showing that the data is strongly correlated
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Figure 18: Exports data comparison Figure 19: GDP and total output
Notes: The left-hand figure compares the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) export data with data
obtained from the World Trade Organization. The right-hand figure compares total output data from
the URA’s tax data with GDP data from the World Bank.
with the external source.
Figure 19 shows a comparison between the total output variable used in the tax data
and GDP data from the World Bank. Unsurprisingly, the tax data is smaller than the
GDP data given the tax data only observes formal sector firms. Importantly, like in 18,
the correlation between the two lines is very strong again supporting the reliability of the
tax data.
Finally, Spray andWolf (2016) show the distribution of firms in each sector is consistent
with those in the Uganda Business Census.
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B. Mathematical Appendix
B.1. Comparative Statics in the two-period model















aσθDπ(sD) + (1− a)σθIπ(sI)− k(a)
}
. (B.2)
This yields a first order condition
σθDπsD − σθIπsI −
∂k
∂a
= f(a, τI) = 0. (B.3)
Totally differentiating B.3 and rearranging yields the comparative static of how a






































− σ2(γB − 1)θDBDπ(sD)− σ2(βB − 1)θIBIπ(sI)
(B.6)
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B.1.2. Matching efficiency


































Rewriting the matching efficiency A by expanding the market tightness yields the
following equation,
A = aγBSγSBγB−1 + ψI(1− a)βBSβSBβB−1. (B.8)













γB−1SγSBγB−1 − βBψI(1− a)βB−1SβSBβB−1
] (B.9)




< 0 ⇐⇒ γBaγB−1SγSBγB−1 < βBψI(1− a)βB−1SβSBβB−1
γBa
γB−1 < βBψI(1− a)βB−1SβS−γSBβB−γB
(B.10)
Therefore, the change in welfare due to matching efficiency following a fall in trade costs
depends on a, ψI and the matching exponents γB, γS, βB, βS. The main takeaway from
equation B.10 is that for a sufficiently large and ψ ≥ 1, the change in welfare due to
matching depends on the relative size of the matching exponents. If γB < βB and γS < βS
i.e. returns to search are higher in the international market, then an increase in trade
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cost will lower welfare given firms move from matching in the increasing returns to scale
international market to the decreasing returns to scale domestic market.
B.2. Transfer Equation
As shown in EJTX (2016), if cost per unit quality does not vary across products within
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C. Empirical Appendix
C.1. Descriptive Statistics
Figure 20: Transport Costs and Imports
Notes: The black line shows transport cost in USD per 20-foot container from the World Bank’s Trading
Across Border Index between 2007-2014, the bars contains data on the total number of importers. The
data for comes from customs dataset. Reforms took place between 2010 and 2011.
Figure 21: Transport Costs and Imports
Notes: The black line shows transport cost in USD per 20-foot container from the World Bank’s Trading
Across Border Index, light grey bars on the left-hand graph show the average number of import suppliers
for importers, and dark grey bars on the right-hand graph show the proportion of firms which import.
The reason for the shorter time series is that I do not know the identity of import suppliers prior to 2010.
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First Time Import in 2011i × 2011t -0.167∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0244)
First Time Import in 2011i 0.712∗∗∗
(0.00981)
Observations 162190 162190
Year FE YES YES
Buyer FE NO YES
Notes: Unit of observation is buyer i and year t. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the buyer level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01






Dropped by 2011 first time importerf × 2011t 0.0370∗∗∗ 0.0404∗∗∗
(0.00821) (0.00608)
Dropped by 2011 first time importerf 0.0267∗∗∗
(0.00329)
Observations 96470 96470
Year FE YES YES
Buyer FE NO YES
Notes: Unit of observation is supplier f and year t. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the buyer level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01






First Time Import in 2011i × 2011t -0.354∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗
(0.0572) (0.0381)
First Time Import in 2011i 1.658∗∗∗
(0.0230)
Observations 160138 108380
Year FE YES YES
Buyer FE NO YES
Notes: Unit of observation is buyer i and year t. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the buyer level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 13: Dropped suppliers’ new matches - value
(1) (2)
Proportion of value from
buyers which don’t import
Proportion of value from
buyers which don’t import
Dropped by 2011 first time importerf × 2011t 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.00631
(0.00697) (0.00486)
Dropped by 2011 first time importerf 0.00292
(0.00360)
Observations 96103 84908
Year FE YES YES
Buyer FE NO YES
Notes: Unit of observation is supplier f and year t. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the buyer level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 14: Same and next-door balance table
Distance Proportion of firms in same sector Difference with same building
Same building 0.097
(0.296)
Next-door building 0.088 -0.009
(0.284) (0.014)
Next-door building < distance < 0.1km 0.060 -0.037***
(0.237) (0.012)
0.1km < distance < 0.15km 0.051 -0.046***
(0.219) (0.017)
0.15km < distance < 0.2km 0.044 -0.053**
(0.204) (0.021)
0.2km < distance < 0.25km 0.040 -0.057**
(0.196) (0.026)
C.2. Robustness Tests
C.2.1. Very local shocks drive results
To address the concern that shocks drive reduced form results, I look at the proportion of
firms in the same building which are in the same ISIC 4-digit sector and compare that to
the proportion of firms in the next-door building. Results are shown in Table 14. While
there is a small difference, it is not statistically significant. However, when I look at firms
further away, I do see this difference increasing. I therefore conclude that there is some
firm agglomeration, but that it is happening at a block level and not at a building level.
C.2.2. Spillover exists but is not search related
A second alternative explanation is that a spillover is taking place, but that it is not
search related. For instance, we might expect that transport costs could be driving the
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Xother−cityt−1 × EACf -0.00486 hhhh
(0.00552) hhhh
Observations 4834635 hhhh
Notes: Unit of observation is buyer i, supplier f and year t. Yift in-
dicates a first match took place between buyer and supplier. Xkift is
a count of buyers in region k which added supplier f in t − 1. EACf
indicates the supplier operates in the East African Community. Co-
efficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point marginal
effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the buyer level. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
results. To allay these concerns, I test if the marginal effect is smaller among firms where
one would expect search frictions to be less prevalent. To test for this, I interact the
independent variables with whether the import supplier exported from the East African
Community (EAC). This is because one would expect search frictions to be smaller in
local neighbors like Kenya or Tanzania when compared to more distant locations. We
would therefore expect when estimating equation C.1 that the positive search externality







Results shown in Table 15 confirm that suppliers in the EAC have a smaller positive
spillover. This is again consistent with a narrative in which search is driving results.
Another prediction consistent with search frictions, is that suppliers which are not
supply-constrained will be able to match with multiple buyers, and so we should not
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Xother−cityt−1 × exporterf 0.00268∗∗ hhhh
(0.000609) hhhh
Observations 27975967 hhhh
Notes: Unit of observation is buyer i, supplier f and year t. Yift indicates a
first match took place between buyer and supplier. Xkift is a count of buyers
in region k which added supplier f in t−1. exporterf indicates supplier f is
an exporter. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to read as percentage point
marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the buyer level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
observe a negative congestion effect.
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, this is the reason why we did not expect to find a strong
congestion externality on foreign imports, given international suppliers are characterized
by being large firms with cheap access to credit and multiple customers. By contrast,
domestic Ugandan firms are characterized by being small with limited access to credit.
You might therefore expect that Ugandan firms cannot make multiple matches in a given
period, thus making the domestic market more congested.
If this is indeed the case, I would expect domestic Ugandan suppliers which are also
exporters to act in a similar way to foreign exporters, as they are less likely to be supply







Results in Table 16 show that domestic suppliers which are exporters, and hence less
supply constrained, have a smaller negative effect from making a match elsewhere in the
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country. This is again consistent with the search narrative.
Table 17: Domestic Suppliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)















Xothert−1 -0.00778∗∗∗ -0.00771∗∗∗ -0.00768∗∗∗ -0.00795∗∗∗
(0.00188) (0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00188)
Year and Buyer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27975967 27975967 27975967 27975967
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Import Suppliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)















Xothert−1 -0.00178∗∗∗ -0.00130∗∗∗ -0.00173∗∗∗ -0.00155∗∗∗
(0.000357) (0.000357) (0.000357) (0.000357)
Year and Buyer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4834635 4834635 4834635 4834635
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
